DEFENCE
The Enemy Within
It’s transition time for the armed forces as threats become more complex
FEROZ AHMED
14 Aug 2008
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Not On Target: The Indian soldier, unlike his
western counterparts, is unprepared for
modern warfare (AP) |
Over the past six decades, India’s armed forces have acquitted themselves rather well in war and in peace. The injury to its image after the loss of territory to China in 1962 was made up by a decisive victory over Pakistan in 1971. Through other stalemates with Pakistan, and the continuing fight against terrorists and insurgents, the forces have ensured enough peace to allow Indians to get on with their lives reasonably freely and fearlessly. However, their job is beginning to get tougher as the threats become more complex, and their role extends beyond protection of the borders.
In addition to the traditional responsibility of securing the border with Pakistan, there is now a threat of a nuclear strike from there if the extremists snatch power. China is encircling India through its military relations with Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. India’s energy security is potentially threatened by terrorists targeting oil and gas tankers. The insurgents and terrorists targeting civilian and military targets inside the country have become more audacious and technologically more capable.
“India is faced with the full spectrum of threats — from nuclear confrontation through conventional war to conflicts limited in area, scope or objectives to the lower end friction, such as insurgencies and terrorism,” Air Chief Marshal Fali H. Major noted in his speech on India’s security at New Delhi’s Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis last April. He added that the spectrum of threats had such complexity and technological sophistication that it had become necessary to move away from a threat-based preparation to a more dynamic capability-based approach. “This would help lessen the uncertainty and unpredictability because capabilities could then be readily tailored to suit the challenge at hand,” he said.
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The toughness of the task is further exacerbated by the archaic strategies and skills of the Indian forces, inadequate or outdated equipment and tardy modernisation, questionable procurement practices, excessive dependence on foreign arms suppliers, and an alarming drying up of the pipeline of young officers.
“Indian Army still wants air defence missiles to move along with the strike corp, something that doesn’t happen in the world any more because firing of missile gives away the position of your troops to the enemy,” says the chief executive officer of a private defence firm. He further argues that the army’s plan to buy 1,000 tanks does not make strategic sense as the only country India can use them against is Pakistan, because of mountains and waters on other borders. And given that Pakistan is armed with nuclear weapons, it is unlikely to fight a conventional war for territory.
Tank purchases also exemplify the ills of India’s attempts to develop its own weapon-making capabilities. Indian Army would rather import T-90 tanks from Russia than buy the locally-developed Arjun tank, which it considers unreliable, outdated at start and not even genuinely indigenous as it is a patchwork of imported components.
The Defence Research and Development Organisation, which has taken nearly four decades to develop the tank, accuses the army of fondness for imports. The important thing is that the army can turn its back on Arjun without suffering a loss as it is not a stakeholder in its development. Similarly, separation of the user from development is also afflicting the aircraft, helicopter, missiles and even rifles development programmes.
Not having a domestic military industry has put India on the backfoot in two respects: first, it has to worry a lot about the supplier countries’ imposing sanctions against it in the event of a conflict of interest with them; and second, it cannot use military equipment as currency like China to buy influence with foreign countries that may have something that India desperately needs, such as oil.
Indian forces’ dependence, some would call it preference, on imports has also been its bane. Corruption and ineptitude in imports has tainted the forces’ public image as much as that of the politicians and bureaucrats involved.
The Comptroller and Auditor General of India noted in its 2007 report on the ministry of defence: “The process of technical and trial evaluation did not demonstrate adequate objectivity and fair play.” It pointed out that in 60 per cent of the cases, only a single vendor was qualified after trial evaluation. Besides, “time taken for trial evaluation was unduly long and the time taken for preparation of the trial evaluation report was longer than the trials”.
In fact, the 1990s is considered a lost decade for the Indian forces as they failed to update and upgrade. And now, they are playing catch up. Between 2007 and 2012, India’s defence imports bill would be nearly $45 billion, in addition to about $10 billion annual spending on locally-produced arms and equipment. Indian forces are importing hundreds of aircraft, helicopters, tanks, artillery guns, and tens of submarines and warships in addition to acquiring new-age electronic warfare equipment. According to research and consulting firm Frost & Sullivan, India will become the seventh largest military spender by 2016 after the US, China, UK, France, Russia and Germany, with an annual budget of close to $36 billion a year.
But the biggest worry for the forces pertains to their most potent weapon — the personnel. Last year, the National Defence Academy could admit only about 200 cadets, though it has 300 seats, and the Indian Military Academy could fill only 90 of its 250 seats. Moreover, middle-level officers are taking premature retirement in search of greener pastures in the private sector. Indian Army alone has about 11,000 middle-level officer positions lying vacant.
A senior Indian Army official told BW that the fault lies in the inadequate emoluments for the hard and risky jobs in the forces. “We need to appreciate that a strong perception exists amongst the youth of the country that the compensation package for the nature of work and hardships that the Army expects of them need to be improved,” he says.
While the Sixth Pay Commission has recommended trebling the basic salaries of the service chiefs and generals from Rs 30,000 a month, it has still kept the young officers — lieutenants, captains and majors — in the Rs 25,000-35,000 bracket, which is a fraction of what their peers make doing corporate jobs.
The recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission evoked un-forces-like public protests from serving and retired soldiers and officers, who want significant improvements in the proposed increases in the compensation and pension for defence personnel.
What may, however, solve the staffing problem to some extent is the decision to allow women permanent commission in the forces. Currently, women officers get only short service commission of up to 14 years. And there are only 2,000 women officers, who are mainly on non-combat jobs. Importantly, Indian Air Force (IAF) has now allowed women pilots to undertake combat missions too, something that an ultra-conservative Pakistan did before India. IAF has about 700 women officers.
This is a transition time for the armed forces on every front. It will take all their fighting qualities to overcome the challenges of the increasingly complicated security threats, safeguarding economic interests beyond the borders, and attracting the best men and women to do the job.
feroz (dot) ahmed (at) abp (dot) in
(Businessworld Issue 19-25 August 2008) |