Revisiting The Nuclear Deal

Just when one would have thought that enough has been said and written on the Indo-US nuclear deal, out pops another book that seeks to delve into the intricacies of that subject. Oddly, however, the book is pertinent. For, though the deal is of immense significance, there remain many aspects of it that are not fully appreciated or understood. Former bureaucrat-turned-strategic analyst P.R. Chari seeks to provide an overview of the historic deal and a modicum of insight into its intricacies. The result is a very useful book indeed. More so because half of the book is made up of an extremely useful appendix containing key documents and text of legislation.

Chari ploughs into the subject with an introduction that gives an overview of the subject and goes on to argue that the deal was good for India. He believes that the deal will help India’s struggling civilian nuclear sector without hampering its strategic weapons programme. Also, it will not circumscribe India’s foreign policy options.

Journalist Vidya Shankar Aiyar’s short but significant essay, ‘Prime Time Deal’, explains how the media did not appreciate the key point that the deal was driven by Washington and not New Delhi. He points out that the deal was part of a larger strategic relationship the US wanted with India. The Indian leadership was drawn into the deal and later tried to pass it off as something it had come up with on its own.

P.R. Chari is currently research professor at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi. He has worked extensively on nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and Indian security issues. He has published over 1,400 op-ed articles in newspapers/websites and over 130 monographs and major papers in learned journals/chapters in books abroad and in India. Chari is also former member of the Indian Administrative Service and has served in several senior positions in the central and state governments. He has served two spells (1971-75 and 1985-88) in the Ministry of Defence.

Perhaps the most significant parts of the book is the space it devotes to challenging the view that the deal hurts India’s strategic weapons programme. Chari argues that it does not “circumscribe India’s strategic programme, since its military facilities and installations will remain outside the purview of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The question of how many nuclear weapons are required to establish a credible nuclear arsenal governs how much fissile material is required for its manufacture, which in turn derives from the estimated size and shape of India’s credible minimum deterrent. Any rational estimate of the requirements of India’s credible nuclear deterrent would suggest that its separated military facilities are quite adequate”.